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Husserl and Levinas:
From the Experience of Intersubjectivity 
to the Encounter with the Other
João Carvalho1
(Universidade de Lisboa)
Doubtless it is Husserl who is at the origin of my writings.2
1. Introduction: the transcendental significance of intersubjectivity in 
Husserl’s phenomenology
Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity is largely 
an analysis on how one can have consciousness of another experiencing 
subject within the theoretical and methodological framework of the pure 
transcendental reduced ego.
The topic of other‑awareness, as well as its transcendental signifi-
cance to phenomenology, is discussed in detail in the 5th of the Cartesian 
Meditations.3 There, Husserl addresses the topic on the basis of a new level 
of constitution of objectivity as he maintains that a fully objective apprehen-
sion of the object of experience depends on its intersubjective constitution. 
1 joao.adri.carvalho@gmail.com
2  Emmanuel Levinas, “Nonintentional Consciousness” in Id., Entre Nous. On 
Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. M. Smith and B. Harshav, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1998, p. 123.
3  Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. D. Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1960.
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That is to say, the spatio-temporal object of my perception may be given 
with the sense of being linked to both myself and others in virtue of the 
properties of its intentional experience. In Husserl’s terms, the phenome-
nological analysis reveals a deeper level of constitution, insofar as the ob-
ject is constituted as the “intersubjectively identical physical thing”4, in the 
sense it is available to intentional acts by different subjects of experience. 
The experience I have of objects with an intersubjective identical 
sense presupposes my consciousness of other experiencing subjects. For 
only by understanding such specific mode of givenness can one account for 
the transcendental structures of the fully objective, intersubjective world, 
which is not entirely reducible to the intentional acts in which it is given, 
precisely due to the fact that it is also the reference point of possible acts 
of consciousness by other subjects of experience. Thus, the significance 
and reach of the problem of intersubjectivity from a transcendental point 
of view is not only to make sense of the world’s transcendence as a whole 
but also – and this task must be the point of departure – to explain the spe-
cific mode of givenness of a particular sort of entity: the other. It is thus, as 
Michael Theunissen puts it, the transcendental meaning of the alien subject 
that is primarily in question in the husserlian theory of intersubjectivity5 
– or, in Husserl’s own terms, “the transcendental constitution of other sub-
jects and accordingly the transcendental sense ‘other subjects’[…]”.6
Hence, the transcendental analysis of my experience of the other, of 
the alter ego, is entailed as a necessary condition for the development of an 
intersubjective account of objective constitution.
Any transcendental analysis of my consciousness of the other must 
entail universal validity since, following the phenomenological method, it 
should be based on a descriptive elucidation and an eidetic intuition of the 
universal structures of any possible experience of the other.7
That is to say, transcendental phenomenology as a systematic elu-
cidation of the object’s constitution through disclosure of “those modes 
of intentional flux that pertain to it”8 is not concerned with the empirical 
and factual conditions of my awareness of the other, nor with examining 
4  Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological 
Philosophy, First Book, trans. F. Kersten, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982, §151, p. 363.
5  Michael Theunissen, The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, 
Sartre and Buber, trans. C. Macann, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986, p. 55-56.
6  Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §44, p. 92. 
7  Cf. Shaun Gallagher, “Fenomenologia da Intersubjectividade: perspectivas 
transcendentais e empíricas”, Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 42 (2012), p. 558.
8  Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §21, p. 51.
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my experience of the other as a real, psychological event.9 The transcen-
dental constitution of an object endowed with the sense ‘other’ is primar-
ily a phenomenological analysis of its essential structures or, in Husserl’s 
terms, of its “set of structural types, which is ‘invariable’, inviolably the 
same”.10 Hence, Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of intersubjectivity 
aims to provide a description of the essential noematic structures of the 
“other” as well as of the nature of the noetic acts involving its “sense giv-
ing” (Sinngebung). In Husserl’s terms, a transcendental analysis of the ex-
perience of the other should determine “in what intentionalities, syntheses, 
motivations, the sense ‘other ego’ becomes fashioned in me”.11
The other, Husserl maintained, is in the phenomenological sense a 
very particular object since it cannot be reduced to its physical presence. 
The structures of consciousness that entitle us to represent the other as an 
other subject cannot be reduced to the pure formal structures of all objects 
of experience, due to the very fact that my understanding of the other can-
not be submitted to the strictures of direct verification, nor can I have an 
original experience of the other’s inner conscious life.12
In fact, the other as an other ego cannot be perceived or given di-
rectly, neither can be presented as something originarily, “in the flesh”, 
in propria persona. The other is, to put it simply, inaccessible in direct 
experience. Hence, the other is this particular kind of subject matter of the 
phenomenological research that cannot be made directly present in expe-
rience – and thus can never be present in my original immanent sphere of 
consciousness – due to its own being, its own essence.
9  In The Paris Lectures, Husserl gives a brief but accurate description of the nature of 
phenomenology as transcendental idealism:
“Our idealism is nothing other than a consistently carried through self-disclosure, that is, in 
the form of a systematic egological science, of any meaning of being which makes sense 
to me, the ego. […] It is an idealism, rather, which follows from a genuinely worked‑out 
analysis of meanings as these appear (to the ego in experience) in the transcendence of 
nature, of culture and of the world in general, which is, in turn, the systematic disclosure 
of the constituting intentionality it the project of phenomenology as transcendental 
idealism”. Edmund Husserl, The Paris Lectures, trans. P. Koestenbaum, The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, pp. 33-34.
From here, the author can arrive at a definitive conclusion of phenomenology as a 
“consequentially executed self‑explication in the form of a systematic egological science, 
an explication of my ego as subject of every possible cognition, and indeed with respect 
to every sense of what exists, wherewith the latter might be able to have a sense for me, 
the ego”. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §41, p. 86.
10  Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §21, p. 51.
11  Ibid., §42, p. 90.
12  Cf. Ibid, §42.
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The other’s experiences necessarily escape my experience as I can-
not verify the nature of those experiences through direct perception.
The other is, in this sense, the paradigmatic concept of “transcend-
ence”, insofar as it refers to that which transcends the field of conscious-
ness immanent to the subject. In Ideas I Husserl declared that phenomenol-
ogy consists in a descriptive eidetic theory of pure experience insofar as it 
is concerned to be a doctrine of “transcendentally pure mental processes as 
viewed in the phenomenological attitude”.13 However, the following prob-
lem arises when one considers this definition of phenomenology within the 
framework of intersubjectivity: on the one hand, if pure experience entails, 
in the husserlian sense, a specific way of being present to one’s conscious-
ness, the first difficulty of a phenomenological analysis of intersubjectivity 
will be to explain how the other, precisely that which transcends the self, 
can be constituted in me, within the field of my transcendental ego, if it 
cannot, by essence, receive its (noematic) structural sense from any inten-
tional act of my conscious life. On the other hand, the internal structures of 
the other, as of any object of my experience, must respect the methodolog-
ical demand that Husserl had put forward in the 5th Cartesian Meditation, 
according to which “every sense that any existent whatever has or can have 
for me ‑ in respect of its ‘what’ and its ‘it exists and actually is’ – is a sense 
in and arising from my intentional life, becoming clarified and uncovered 
for me in consequence of my life’s constitutive synthesis, in systems of 
harmonious verification”.14
Hence, the difficulty lies in understanding which intentional struc-
tures of consciousness are involved when I experience the other and how 
the other, as the paradigmatic concept of transcendence, can be constituted 
within the theoretical framework of my pure transcendental ego, precisely 
if the transcendental-phenomenological reductions of the world to com-
plex structures of sense, and these to the subjective sphere of the ego, had 
suspended specific metaphysical theses about the existence of transcend-
ence and about the nature of such an object of experience.
 
13  Cf. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological 
Philosophy, First Book, §75, p. 167.
14  Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §43, p. 91.
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2. Husserl’s solution to the problem of constituting the alter ego
Among the fundamental beliefs of the 5th Cartesian Meditations is 
the belief that to experience the other consists in grasping a unity of anoth-
er’s harmonious behaviour through the perception of its own kinaesthetic 
sensations, that I understand as signs of a “governing” (Walten) “living 
body” (Leib), and by means of which I recognize the other as another 
subject of experience in the midst of a “surrounding world” (Umwelt).15 
In fact, Husserl claims that I experience others not only as world objects 
but also “as governing psychically in their respective natural organisms”.16 
 Therefore, for Husserl, to see the other as a subject of experience is 
to perceive a global behaviour which expresses an ongoing practical rela-
tionship with this “surrounding world”. For my perception of the other is 
not just an act of apprehending its relationship with its world; it is mainly 
an act of integrating the world that the other experiences within my own 
“surrounding world”, thus constituting an intersubjective shared world, 
with common structures valid both to me and to others.17
It is thus the presentation of the body of the other that motivates 
the “appresentation” (Appräsentation) of his psychic life. Hence, the own 
body is, for Husserl, the basis for understanding the bodily behaviour of 
the other. In this sense, my non-original apperception of the other through 
my perception of its “living body” (Leib) is experienced on the basis of an 
analogy with my own experience and with my inner conscious life:
In this pre-eminent intentionality there becomes constituted for me the 
new existence‑sense that goes beyond my monadic very‑ownness; there 
becomes constituted an ego, not as “I myself”, but as mirrored in my 
own Ego, in my monad. The second ego, however, is not simply there 
and strictly presented; rather is he constituted as “alter ego” - the ego 
indicated as one moment by this expression being I myself in my own-
ness. The “Other”, according to his own constituted sense, points to me 
myself; the other is a “mirroring” of my own self [...].18
According to Husserl, my understanding of this alter ego occurs in three 
stages, each adding a new layer of sense to the previous one. In the first 
15  Ibid., §52, p. 114.
16  Ibid., §43, p. 91.
17  Cf. Pedro Alves, “Lévinas crítico de Husserl e de Sartre sobre a teoria da 
intersubjectividade e da alteridade”, in Cristina Beckert (coord.), Lévinas entre nós, 
Lisboa: Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, 2006, p. 144.
18  Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §44, p. 94. The italics are mine.
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stage, I apprehend the other in its physicality, purely as an object of my 
perception. Secondly, I recognize a visual similarity between my body 
and the bodily appearance of the other. Through a similarity with my own 
body, I understand that the other, like myself, has an external appearance 
which does not present all of the other’s nature. Then, I transfer to the 
other a meaning or sense that I already possess and recognize as mine, 
through a process of “analogizing” or “assimilating apperception”. My or-
ganic body thus functions as a mediator of the alien experience, since, at 
all times, serves as the “primal establishment” or “originary foundation” 
(Urstiftung). Since it is always prominent in the field of actual and possible 
perceptions and since it is “equipped” with the specific sense of “primor-
dial originariness”19 it is the psychophysical ego that brings the other as 
having an ongoing sense, identical to the sense I attribute myself.
Thus, one can say that according to Husserl, my apprehension 
(Auffassung) of the alter ego follows a spatial frame in which the alien 
body appears to my perception. But while the preceding analysis took 
place mainly within the circle of my perception – for the interpretation of 
behaviour is actually a perceptual experience – Husserl identifies a new 
stage of constitution of the other, that, as Paul Ricœur states, intends to add 
to the alien experience a new layer of sense through free creations of the 
imagination.20 For Husserl, I grasp this new sense of the other in the mode 
of “if I were there” (illic). I am “here” (hic) but through free variations of 
my imagination I realize I could be “there” (illic), where the other is, and 
see the same things under another perspective – thus, the other is the alter 
ego in the mode of “there”.
Hence, in Husserl’s analysis the different levels of constitution mark 
a new step in the direction of the suppression of alterity, of otherness, since 
the other, the alter ego, regardless of its distinctiveness, is apprehend-
ed in what Husserl calls a “unity of similarity”21, an associative relation 
(Paarung) in which my body and the body of the other are given “in the 
unity of a consciousness”22, and through which a sense-giving transfer oc-
curs into another life in my imagination.
Although the different moments and stages of the constitution of the 
alter ego do not present to my own sphere the subjective life of the other 
19  Ibid., §51, p. 113.
20  Cf. Paul Ricœur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, trans. E. Ballard and L. 
Embree, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967, pp. 128-129.
21  Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §51, p. 112.
22  Ibid.
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‘in the original’, they do, at the heart of the analogical transfer, try to render 
the other intelligible through the movement of encroachment by which the 
sense “ego” is transferred from the original - myself as a psychophysical 
unity - to the analogue.23 In fact, the passive association of pairing, which 
takes place on the basis of similarity, is the condition of possibility that 
allows me to understand in the other a sense that is not accessible to me in 
the original, but which I transfer to it. It is thus in this sense that Husserl’s 
finds in pairing “a mutual awakening and an overlaying of each with the 
objective sense of the other”.24
Husserl’s use of the concept of “empathy” (Einfühlung) to name the 
specific experience of the transcendental alter ego25 entails precisely this 
sense, for it names a quasi-perceptual awareness of the other just like the 
awareness I have of myself as a subject of experience.26
In Husserl’s analysis, thus, intersubjective consciousness is a pro-
cess of transfer based on likeness between an open plurality of subjects. 
The consciousness of an other is not an awareness of an other that mani-
fests itself in its own sense, but consciousness of an alter ego that receives 
its structural, constitutive sense from the sphere of my ownness. That is to 
say, to have consciousness of an other, in Husserl’s sense, does not mean 
to have consciousness of an absolutely other, as a limit (which would nec-
essarily escape absolutely from my sphere of ownness); it means, instead, 
to have consciousness of an alter ego, who is an ego in the same sense as 
I am an ego. This specific mediation that characterizes Husserl’s analysis 
of the experience of the other thus account for its progressive suppression 
of alterity.
23  Ibid., §50, p. 110. Cf. Paul Ricœur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, p. 129.
24  Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §51, p. 113.
The husserlian theme of the “mutual awakening” will be recovered by Emmanuel Levinas, 
in the broader context of the development of his philosophy of alterity, to indicate the 
rupture of the Same, an awakening coming from the other that ceaselessly puts the 
priority of the Same into question:
“Husserl’s theory of Intersubjective Reduction describes the astonishing or traumatizing 
(trauma, not thauma) possibility of a sobering up in which the I, facing the Other, is 
freed from itself and awakens from dogmatic slumber. [...] The Reduction, repeating as 
it were the disturbance of the Same by the Other who is not absorbed into the Same [...] 
describes the awakening [...]”. Emmanuel Levinas, “Philosophy and Awakening” in Id., 
Entre Nous. On Thinking-of-the-Other, p. 87.
25  Cf. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §61, p. 146.
26  For a brief account of the problem of ‘empathy’ and ‘emphatic experience’ on Husserl’s 
phenomenology cf. Michael Theunissen, The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of 
Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Buber, pp. 69-72.
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3. Levinas’ critique of Husserl’s account of alterity
In sharp contrast with Husserl’s approach to the problem of alterity, 
Levinas understood that the experience of the other does not entail an an-
alogical transfer of sense, by which the life of the other is comprehended 
through my inner conscious life – and in which the otherness is dependent 
on the sameness. According to Levinas, the experience of the other fun-
damentally consists in the expression of an absolute limit, an irruption of 
pure exteriority irreducible to immanence, that manifests the sense of the 
asymmetrical encounter with the other in the face-to-face relation. Hence, 
it is, for Levinas, the asymmetrical sense of the way in which the other 
expresses itself (kath’auto) that the phenomenological description of inter-
subjectivity should firstly explain in its constitutiveness: a level of experi-
ence that Husserl failed to describe.
One of the main purposes of Levinas’ works is to understand the 
expressiveness of this alterity prior to the husserlian analysis and processes 
in which this expressiveness becomes attenuated, and at the limit, elided. 
The concept “Face” (visage) is used to describe “the way in which the oth-
er presents himself”27 in its otherness as absolute resistance to my sphere 
of immanence.
Differently from a constitutive theory of alterity, differently from a 
transcendental analysis of intersubjectivity, one can find the main focus of 
Levinas’ works to be the sense of this radical alterity, the thematic fixation on 
the sense structures of its expressiveness, beyond the limits in which Husserl 
had confined it to “the presence of being” and the “identity of the Same”.28
Besides, we should note that Levinas’ idea of a transcendence be-
yond the totality of being and identity of the Same – his insistence that 
ethics precedes ontology – calls into question not only Husserl’s transcen-
dental analysis of the other but also the priority of being and the traditional 
platonic understanding of the way kinds relate to other kinds, as described 
in the central section of The Sophist.29 In fact, Levinas thinking of alterity is 
27  Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity. An essay in exteriority, trans. A. Lingis, The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007, p. 50.
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas presents an accurate description of this concept: “The way 
in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name 
face”. Ibid.
28  Emmanuel Levinas, “Philosophy and Awakening” in Id., Entre Nous. On 
Thinking-of-the-Other, p. 88.
29  Cf. Pedro Alves, “Lévinas crítico de Husserl e de Sartre sobre a teoria da intersubjectividade 
e da alteridade”, p. 146-147.
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deeper than the mere difference between beings that participate in the kind 
of Being. Levinas insists in a form of radical alterity that does not depend 
on any quality that would distinguish beings neither does he conceive the 
alterity of the other, which expresses itself in the face‑to‑face encounter, 
as an ontological movement. He speaks of a state that is “otherwise than 
being” (autrement qu’être) for the alterity of the other is deeper than any 
sort of ontological mediation, in the sense that the other reveals himself as 
an absolutely other (absolument autre), irreducible not only to my inner 
conscious life but also to the immanent field of being and, in consequence, 
to Husserl’s concept of “surrounding world” (Umwelt).
In light of this, I can hold that Levinas is not mainly concerned with 
the philosophical category of “alterity” nor with the transcendental, im-
personal meaning of “otherness”, but, instead, with the sense of this irre-
ducible concrete relation of the face‑to‑face experience, that is to say, with 
alterity as the primordial mode of experience (which shows itself in what 
Levinas calls the “traumatism of awakefullness”30). It is at this level that I 
recognize Levinas’ revision of Husserl’s topic of intersubjectivity, revision 
which I would now like to address in the remainder of this paper.
We should firstly note that Levinas holds that in Husserl’s phenome-
nology metaphysical exteriority is reduced to the fundamental immanence 
of the Self. There is a specific sense in which Husserl’s concept of inten-
tionality entails, according to Levinas, a reduction of exteriority to the im-
manence of consciousness, since the thinking and the thinkable, the corre-
lation between thought and world is given in the unity of my consciousness. 
It is precisely this sense of the intentional experience, in which the Same 
rediscovers itself in the Other, that Levinas puts in question, recovering 
the fundamental idea of his own reading of the 5th Cartesian Meditation: 
an essential inadequacy between the original perception of myself and the 
analogical - thus “non-original” - apprehension of the other is always op-
erating at the heart of the intersubjective experience, or, in Levinas’ words:
[…] intentionality, where thought remains an adequation with the object, 
does not define consciousness at its fundamental level. All knowing qua 
intentionality already presupposes the idea of infinite, which is pre‑emi-
nently non-adequation.31
30  Emmanuel Levinas, “Philosophy and Awakening” in Id., Entre Nous. On 
Thinking-of-the-Other, p. 86.
31  Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity. An essay in exteriority, p. 27.
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In light of this, the intersubjective experience is no longer understood on 
the basis of an imaginative, fictional symmetrical relation between two 
egos, but it is instead apprehended on the basis of a radical difference be-
tween myself and what appears and expresses itself as an absolutely other. 
Hence, the sense of experience can no longer be stated in terms of percep-
tual evidence, as in Husserl’s analysis. Levinas thus revises the sense of the 
term redefining it as “a relation with the absolutely other, that is, with what 
always overflows thought […]”.32
In this regard, the description of the other as an “absolutely oth-
er” will henceforth thwart any reduction of heterogeneity to objectivity, 
which for Levinas was still the husserlian mode of approaching the other. 
Moreover, my experience of alterity can no longer be described in terms of 
a type of constituting activity of the ego. The task is now to investigate the 
structural sense “other person”, not on the basis of the sphere of ownness, 
but having as point of departure a primordial sense that emerges with the 
irruption of the other, as a relation to a pure exteriority prior to the identity 
of the Same. This sense exceeds the idea of the other in me for it is a sense 
received from an encounter with an absolute limit, from an experience 
prior and more decisive that any form of impersonal transcendental expe-
rience of intersubjectivity.
It is precisely the primacy of the face-to-face relation, Levinas ar-
gues, that constitutes the non‑gnoseological event necessary to reflection 
and constitution themselves, and which makes the “primordial spher” lose 
its priority.33 This event ‑ the ethical exigence of the face ‑ describes the 
disturbance of the Same and entails a psychic life governed by an ethics 
prior to any form of subjective constitution.
Given my interpretation, I would argue that for Levinas the essence 
of subjectivity is alterity, in the sense that alterity is its condition of possi-
bility. For Levinas, the other precedes me and the grasping of the other is 
that which allows me to grasp myself as a subject. This is the core element 
lacking in Husserl’s approach to constituting the other: a specific and ir-
reducible meaning of “transcendence-in-immanence” characterizes, at its 
core, the essential structure of subjectivity. Hence, for Levinas, the relation 
to the nonlimited by the Same, the absolutely other, is now an expression 
of another person that does not receive his sense from me, but who entails, 
in himself, an ethical resistance to every act of “sense giving” transfer that 
Husserl describes.
32  Ibid., p. 25.
33  Emmanuel Levinas, “Philosophy and Awakening” in Id., Entre Nous. On 
Thinking-of-the-Other, pp. 86-87.
João Carvalho
Philosophica 51.indd   124 11/04/2018   9:37:29 PM
125
The present inquiry does not constitute a defence of such a thesis, 
neither does it explore the importance of this claim in Levinas’ oeuvre. 
But in developing this reading I have shown how Levinas’ thinking of the 
other remains in debt to the fundamental topic of Husserl’s 5th Cartesian 
Mediation: the problem of (in)adequacy between sphere of ownness and 
alterity, immanence and transcendence.
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ABSTRACT
This paper presents two different, although related, approaches to the 
problem of the experience of the other person: E. Husserl’s phenomenology of 
intersubjectivity and E. Levinas’ ethics. I begin by (1) addressing the transcendental 
significance of the experience of intersubjectivity in the broader context of 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. I then turn to (2) Husserl’s solution to the 
paradox of constituting the alter ego, identifying and elucidating the key‑concepts 
of his inquiry. I hold that throughout his analysis there is a dominant underlying 
meaning in which the alterity of the other person is progressively suppressed and, 
ultimately, elided. Finally, I discuss (3) the consequences of Husserl’s analysis 
of the other in light of Levinas’ ethics. I hold that Husserl’s claim that there is 
a fundamental difference between the experience of myself and my analogical 
experience of the other is the basis upon which Levinas’ develops a new concept 
of experience, not as perception but as encounter. Upon close reading, I claim that 
Levinas’ revision of the topic of alterity is, ultimately, a consequence of Husserl’s 
transcendental analysis of intersubjectivity.
Keywords: Phenomenology – Intersubjectivity – Alterity – Edmund Husserl – 
Emmanuel Levinas 
RESUMO
Este ensaio apresenta duas abordagens distintas, embora estreitamente 
relacionadas, ao problema filosófico da experiência do outro: a fenomenologia da 
intersubjectividade de E. Husserl e a ética de E. Levinas. Começo por (1) aproximar 
o significado transcendental da experiência da intersubjectividade na matriz teórica 
da fenomenologia husserliana. De seguida, procuro (2) apresentar a solução que 
Husserl oferece ao paradoxo constitutivo do alter ego, identificando e elucidando os 
conceitos-chave da sua abordagem. Defendo que esta análise sustém uma estrutura 
de sentido dominante, segundo a qual a alteridade do outro é progressivamente 
suprimida e, no limite, elidida. Por fim, (3) abordo as consequências da análise 
husserliana da constituição do outro à luz da ética de Levinas. Procuro defender 
que a concessão de Husserl de que existe uma diferença fundamental entre a 
experiência de si e a experiência analógica do outro constitui a base a partir da qual 
Levinas desenvolve uma outra concepção de experiência, não enquanto perceção, 
mas fundamentalmente como encontro. A leitura que desenvolvo procura, por 
fim, sugerir que a revisão levinasiana do tópico da alteridade se deixa inscrever, 
fundamentalmente, como uma consequência da análise transcendental que Husserl 
desenvolve em redor do conceito de intersubjectividade.
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